Ahmadinejad raises nuclear hopes (again)

There are no full stops in negotiations with Iran. Even when the fat lady sings, there is always the prospect of an overture, or an entirely new performance. After three months of prevarication over the uranium export deal first agreed in Geneva in October, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) finally received what seemed like a definitive 'no' on the main terms of the bargain from Tehran last month. Now, days later, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appears to be saying he has no problem with the deal . What is going on? As is usual in dealings with Iran, no one is quite sure. The other parties to the would-be deal - the IAEA, Russia, the US and France - do not seem to have heard anything. That is par for the course. From past experience it seems likely we are witnessing an internal debate being aired in public, or a deliberate attempt to inject uncertainty back into the mix to forestall talk of sanctions or worse. From the start, Ahmadinejad was the deal's biggest backer in Tehran, paradoxically putting him on the side of international engagement while his opponents in the 'green movement' played the nationalist card and denounced it. Their opposition would not have meant much if it had not resonated with the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei and other conservatives, but they were sceptical too. In his remarks last night, the president referred to the internal dispute for the first time when he dismissed the concerns of 'colleagues' that the deal was a trap. But why would Ahmadinejad revive a damaging row after the matter appeared to have been officially settled, presumably with the blessing of the top Ayatollah? If this was not an act of insubordination, then last night's interview had been personally permitted by Khamenei, and that suggests a calculated change of tack by the regime as a whole. If it is a genuine about-turn brought on by fear of Israeli military action perhaps, then we should know soon enough. That letter will eventually turn up at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. In the absence of such a document, confusion seems the most likely motive. Ahmadinejad talked about Iran's uranium being out of the country for "four or five months" before fuel rods were sent back from Russia and France. The West's estimate was that it would take about a year. That was the whole point of the Geneva deal. Iran's stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU) would be depleted by about 70% (1200kg) for that twelve-month period,defusing tensions over Tehran's intentions and buying time for diplomacy. With some four months having gone by since the original deal was proposed, during which time Iran's uranium-enriching centrifuges have been constantly spinning, the deal is a lot less attractive to the West. The 1200kg of uranium now represents just half of the total stockpile, so reducing the period of the deal from a year to five months is unlikely to be acceptable. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad did not say whether the 1200kg LEU would be exported all at once, or in batches. If the latter, then it would also fall short of western requirements that the Iranian stockpile be significantly depleted for a meaningful period of time. Tehran's negotiating strategy has always been to avoid a definitive yes or no wherever possible. The aim is to steer clear of any international obligations that would limit its nuclear programme, while trying not to provoke the international community into concerted punitive action. A good bet is that the real motives behind last night's surprise could be a mixture of any or all of the above. For the competing oligarchs in Tehran, clarity is weakness, not a virtue.