Too many cooks in Afghan cabinet
President Karzai has presented Afghanistan's parliament with a revised list of cabinet eight days after the original list was rejected. That original list was a disaster: parliament gave 17 ministers a vote of no confidence . The public regarded the rejection as a sign of genuine democratic progress. After all, there was widespread suspicion that some proposed ministers were stand-ins for the jihadi leader who had backed Karzai's election campaign, while others had been favourites of the international community. But since Afghan politics is no longer a purely domestic affair, the international community was quick to interfere. The UN chief in Kabul, Kai Eide, for example said that parliament's decision was a setback. The international community's contradictory visions for Afghanistan are growing in distance from Afghans' own aspirations. Needless to say, many Afghans are increasingly unhappy about such open interference in their affairs but since the international community is paying the bills, Afghans have little ground for objection. Those who pay the bills also want to a have a say and it was also this latter group of foreign financiers that Karzai took into consideration while drafting his original list. But parliament said no. Yet this is Afghan politics and as a local saying goes, there's always a bowl underneath the bowl. Soon after parliament's rejection was announced, it was leaked to Afghan journalists that the president had deliberately offered parliament a "death list". To put it bluntly, the president had anticipated the rejection. He wanted a vote of no confidence because it offered him a legitimate way to dismiss unwanted figures proposed to him in secret deals with the strongmen who lent him support during the presidential election. According to the leak, the real list was kept hidden in the president's drawer, ready to be presented to parliament as soon it offered its rejection. The current revised list is allegedly the real list. So what do Afghans think of the new list? "Zalmay Rasool as foreign minister? What a joke!" answered a respondent to my question. But why? I probed. "He's been following the president closely since 2001 and if there's a press conference, you'd always find him sitting right next to Karzai. But he has never uttered a word. No one knows what he thinks. He doesn't speak." A positive spin-off of the silent man might be that he is unlikely to indulge in cheap talk, a favourite pastime of Afghan politicians. What do you think of the new list? I asked a fellow Afghan journalist. "At least it's new," was his response. No enthusiasm there. The local press's reception of the revised list was equally lukewarm. The president has drafted the new list in haste, lamented an editorial in Hasht-e Sobh , contradicting the leak. The paper speculated that the president probably hasn't met some of the people he has suggested. The list is indeed full of unfamiliar names belonging to unknown individuals. This is a problem in Afghanistan, where having a reputation is crucial for people in public positions because reputation allows for an accurate judgment of character. According to Hasht-e Sobh, one name on the list stands out: Abdulhadi Arghandiwal. He is the head of the Islamic party, and known for his reluctance to speak out against renegade jihadi leader Gulboddin Hekmatyar. The latter's troops are fighting an armed struggle against the government. According to Hasht-e Sobh, Arghandiwal's appearance on the list signals a shift in Karzai's policy towards extremists. But the revised list also includes three women, presumably to ease fears that Karzai has officially opened cabinet's doors to extremist fundamentalists. The policy of pleasing everyone is in character with Karzai and has dismayed those who wish to see Afghanistan run by a decisive leader with a clear vision. But since historically Afghan governments have been brought down due to internal rivalries rather than public revolts, the president has been acting rationally by co-opting rivals, rather than alienating them. Hence, Karzai's spokesman was quick to clarify that the rejected individuals' skills would be put to use elsewhere. "Karzai is the most tolerant man in Afghanistan," said a supporter in a private conversation. Not all Afghans are happy with this tolerance. Be that as it may, the seeds for the present cabinet troubles were sown months ago, during the presidential campaign. In an unwise move, the strongmen who rallied around Karzai boasted that they had been offered ministerial seats in return for backing the president. The boasting made the news and was discussed with much disgust. The motivation for these sorts of pronouncements might be that the strongmen's powers are diminishing, triggering a desire to impress the public by exaggerating their influence. The strategy has backfired but luckily for the strongmen, their rivals are equally inept. Hence when the first list was rejected, MP Frahi, a member of the National Front, the opposition that lost the election, blurted out that the rejection was the Front's revenge, punishing Karzai for conducting a fraudulent election . This thoughtless outburst insinuated that the Front had influenced parliament's decision, and the rejection had been politically motivated. Frahi stands in a long line of Afghan politicians who have a talent for undermining their own cause. But fortunately for the Front, other MPs dismissed Frahi's remarks. "MPs gave their vote on the basis of merit or lack thereof. No one, neither a front nor a political grouping, can claim this victory for themselves and pronounce that they have influence over parliament's decisions," said Abdul Satar Khawasi, the deputy parliamentary leader. However, it seems the Afghan cabinet is simply not large enough to accommodate the candidates of all interested parties. "Maybe we should set up three cabinets: one for the international community, one for the jihadi leaders and one for the people," said a friend and fellow Afghan, summarising the view of all those tired of foreign interference and internal machinations. The old cliche that too many cooks spoil the broth certainly is true when it comes to Afghanistan.
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