Iraq election: military neutrality is key

On Friday Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announces the results of the country's parliamentary elections, which took place nearly three weeks ago and set various groups and parties off towards a tenacious push for power and allies. Allegations of fraud will no doubt continue to persist after the results are announced. Both leading and losing entities have expressed such concerns: some may be legitimate, while others tend to be tactical, face-saving manoeuvres or simply political posturing. The leading blocs are Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law (SoL) coalition and former premier Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National Movement (INM). Both have issued outspoken warnings of improper dealings. Maliki, however, last week went ahead to call for a manual recount of the votes in his capacity as "commander in chief" of the armed forces, a request that was rejected by IHEC, but which was made in a way that has led some to conclude that Iraq has returned to authoritarianism. And many now question whether Maliki will walk away from office peacefully. As strong as his words may have been, and despite some of the scaremongering comment that followed his statement, Maliki's ability to use the armed forces for the purposes of retaining power by force is extremely limited, if not impossible. Limited because the Iraqi army is not the institution most think it is. While the army has become more united and assertive over recent years, and is largely loyal to the state, it remains multi-faceted in terms of its ethno-sectarian, political and tribal makeup. In other words, you have within the army groups and individuals who have potentially divided or conflicting loyalties, limiting how far it could be mobilised in support of one bloc or party. Although unlikely, it is possible, for instance, for the Arab-dominated army to be deployed against the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdistan region in an all-out war. But such military action would need unity and consensus among the leading representative groups of Arab Iraq – something difficult to achieve both because of their own divisions and because of the historic links and alliances some have with the Kurds. How Maliki will respond in the event that his party comes second depends to some degree on how an ambiguity in the constitution is resolved – namely, whether it is a winning bloc or a post-election coalition that forms the government. If it is the former, then SoL could seek an agreement with IHEC to undertake a partial recount, if not full recount. (President Talibani has also called for a recount, but without specifying whether he wanted a full or partial one.) Failing this, SoL could take the matter to Iraq's supreme court and might organise street protests as a show of support for its stance. If the latter applies – that is, a post-election coalition – then SoL could simply go ahead and form a government with the Iraqi National Alliance, the Kurds, and smaller entities like Tawafuq and the Unity of Iraq alliance. This, of course, depends on what concessions SoL can offer these possible junior partners. The handing-over of power may turn out to be a drawn-out and difficult process but what is certain is that the post-2003 Iraqi army can no longer be mobilised in support of any one man or party, however strong the rhetoric coming from Baghdad may be. Diversity has, therefore, become Iraq's greatest asset. And Iraqis should be hopeful that the days when the army was used against the democratic state and its civilian population are long gone.